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I. Introduction 
Introducing competition in the German market for short-distance public bus 
transport services has brought successes, but also some notable failures. Following 
the international trend towards liberalization in the mid-1990s, German legislators 
implemented a specific framework for awarding contracts structured around two 
parallel license types within a single market: (i) non-commercial licenses (ge-
meinwirtschaftliche Genehmigung, see § 13a PBefG) and (ii) commercial licenses 
(eigenwirtschaftliche Genehmigung, see § 13 PBefG). In practice, both types pro-
vide exclusivity for the licensee.  
However, the resulting complexity of the system is a reason why many research-
ers, as well as global players trying to enter the public transport market, often de-
scribe the regulatory framework as initially incomprehensible. The many different 
failures and pitfalls of the specific German model analyzed by Beck (2009a and 
2010a) raise doubts about the feasibility and user friendliness of this system. Nev-
ertheless the great variety of opportunities for action for authorities and operators 
remains a major advantage.  
An evaluation of international efforts to introduce competition to public transport 
service markets (see van de Velde and Beck 2010) shows numerous different 
models and attempts to regulate the functioning of these markets. In Europe, a 
change of mind, or a possible trend, towards more market-based regimes can be 
observed in recent years. There will also be some effect of the new legislation at 
the EU-level, the European regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007 (hereafter referred to 
as EC 1370) on the awarding of public service contracts for public transport ser-
vices that took effect on December 3, 2009.  
The issue for Germany now is whether a viable alternative to the current model of 
contract awarding could enhance the regulatory framework. Considering current 
discussion about the amendment of the German Passenger Transport Act (Novelle 
des Personenbeförderungsgesetzes – PBefG), the aim of this article is to present 
an attempt to clarify the regulatory framework for short-distance public transport 
services in Germany. Based on the main options possible according to EC 1370, 
my model incorporates the insights of my doctoral thesis, which examines the 
market for commercial and non-commercial services, see also Beck 2009a, 2009b, 
2010a and 2010b. Moreover, the model is based on discussions with many 
transport experts, notably my former colleagues at BSL Management Consultants 
(Julia Ahrend, Caroline von Kretschmann, Mathias Lahrmann, Mirko Schnell, 
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and, in particular, Jörn Meier-Berberich and Marc-Oliver Wille) and attorneys (in 
particular Sybille Barth and Lorenz Wachinger, BBG and Partner). I extend my 
thanks to all of my discussion partners for their useful remarks. I am also grateful 
to Kay Mitusch, my professor at KIT - Karlsruhe Institute for Technology (Section 
for Network Economics, Institute for Economic Policy Research [IWW]). Never-
theless, the usual disclaimer applies and sole responsibility for the proposed model 
is assumed by the author.  
II. An attempt to adjust Germany’s existing institutional framework  
Based on the existing institutional framework, its development over time and the 
market developments for commercial and for non-commercial services discussed 
in my doctoral thesis, I conclude that:  
 the German dichotomy between commercial and non-commercial services 
provides a greater variety of options for operators and PTAs (Public Transport 
Authorities [Aufgabenträger]) than in other parts of the world 
 the German system is still characterized by a significant market share of direct 
awarding, making a fundamental change unrealistic in view of the intense de-
bate about cases where competition has been introduced  
 still, there is ample room for improvements, as the existing framework pre-
vents more dynamic market developments due to the many structural obsta-
cles that increase uncertainty for market participants. 
Regarding the numerous lawsuits and intense debate among legal professionals 
throughout the past decade, any proposed model must provide procedural clarity 
to market participants and ensure more smoothly functioning structures. This 
holds especially with respect to the high level of uncertainty and numerous pitfalls 
resulting from the current regulatory framework.  
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Thus, I propose six objectives for a new model: 
Six objectives for an adjusted model for Germany 
 
The new model should 
1. be flexible in the range of options to ensure efficient market organizations  
2. provide a variety of options for action to operators and PTAs 
3. offer possibilities for a high level of freedom to operators to design services  
4. provide a framework conducive to innovation 
5. contain well-defined regulations for awarding procedures and delegate de-
fined roles and tasks to market participants  
6. avoid legal uncertainties due to unambiguous regulations on awarding pro-
cedures (transparency)  
Below, I discuss how to adjust the existing German framework. The proposal aims 
to solve several of the problems identified during my research on the present regu-
lations for awarding and contracting. At first glance, the process flow chart in Fig-
ure 1 may appear complicated, since the system currently allows several processes 
for awarding. I preserve this diversity but clarify the decision paths to reduce un-
certainty for market participants. The proposal assumes that licenses provide ex-
clusivity during the license term.  
The proposal consists of various decision nodes (explained in detail below). At a 
decision node there are usually several options and a single decision-making party. 
To facilitate my explanations in the following, the numbering in Figure 1 corre-
sponds to that of the subtitles, i.e. the main steps of the procedure. 
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Figure 1: Proposal for an adjusted award model for Germany (decision tree) 
Step 1: LA determines whether a proposed service is new 
To promote innovations within the system, operators (or PTAs) can propose to 
provide a new (additional) service at any time. Upon request by the initiating 
stakeholder, and by involving the PTAs (Public Transport Authorities [Auf-
gabenträger]), the LA (Licensing Authority [Genehmigungsbehörde]) determines 
whether a proposed service really is new.  
If the service in question is classified as new, the LA checks whether the service is 
initiated by an operator and whether the operator claims exclusivity for its pro-
posal. If the operator claims exclusivity, it will be the only player allowed to sub-
mit a bid to operate the service under a commercial license for the first license 
term. If the bid fulfills the usual minimum criteria of the LA,1 the operator is di-
rectly awarded the license for one license term. Thus, this license shows similari-
ties to a patent. By offering “patent”-like exclusivity to the operator initiating the 
process, the proposed model aims to promote innovations as is done in other in-
dustries, while recognizing that the number of such cases will be limited. Of 
course, a “patent” must be handled with care, for example by establishing some 
minimum criteria for a service to be classified as “new”. 
If the service in question is initiated by the PTA, or if the initiating operator does 
not claim exclusivity for its proposal, the LA procedes by clarifying whether the 
service is commercial (i.e. Step 2). 
Step 2: LA starts clarification whether existing service is commercial for the next 
license term  
For existing services, the LA publishes the termination date of the license and the 
validation criteria for a possible CCL procedure (CCL: competition for commer-
cial lines [Genehmigungswettbewerb]) to resolve the problem of unclear or non-
existent validation criteria on the part of the LAs, and the confusion about termi-
nation dates that still exists in some regions.  
___________________ 
1
  The LA is responsible to check compliance with minimum criteria for: security, economic 
capability and reputation of the operator (e.g., adequate delivery of appropriate service ac-
cording to previous PTPs) and fulfillment of minimum quality standards for the service set by 
the PTP. 
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The LA then verifies whether the service would be considered commercial for the 
upcoming license term by studying the expression of interest from either the in-
cumbent operator (Altbetreiber) and/or competing operators desiring to provide 
the service commercially for the next license term. Expressions of interest must be 
submitted within the time frame set by the LA in advance. Without a time limita-
tion, a competitor could (and did in several cases) disrupt an ongoing awarding 
procedure by applying for a commercial service.  
The PTA always remains responsible for defining the minimum quality level (ac-
cording to its definition of services of general interest) to be delivered via its PTP 
(public transport plan [Nahverkehrsplan]). In contrast to the situation today, the 
PTP is binding for the LA in the first instance, and the PTA is obliged to establish 
the PTP in a clear and non-discriminatory manner. Nevertheless, operators are still 
allowed to contribute to the PTP. The PTA can raise or lower the minimum quali-
ty level at the outset to reclassify the service in question from commercial to non-
commercial and vice versa (see Beck 2009a). 
Step 3: For commercial services, LA submits formal market request to operators  
If the LA initially classifies the service as commercial based on the expressions of 
interest by operators as described above, the next step is a formal market request 
which is based on the binding bids submitted by the operators. In this case, the LA 
is obliged to avoid intolerable risks by ensuring transparency on relevant revenue 
data for newcomers (as already observed for several tendering procedures). This 
will reduce the problem of the winner‟s curse which arises when an operator‟s bid 
overestimates the revenue potential. Such a risk has been identified by numerous 
empirical studies as a clear market entry barrier for net-cost contracts tendered. 
Nevertheless, with the aim of providing favorable incentives, operators should 
bear the full revenue risk. If the LA, upon its formal market request, receives no 
bids by operators to operate the service commercially, the LA hands the procedure 
to the PTA which awards supplementary direct subsidies (see Step 4). 
If one bid is received, the LA checks whether it satisfies the minimum criteria and 
then validates it as part of a CCL procedure according to the validation criteria 
published prior to the formal market request. When more than one bid is received, 
the LA selects the best bid with respect to quality in a transparent validation pro-
cedure (quality competition).  
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In contrast to the current situation, the procedure does not provide the incumbent 
(Altbetreiber) with any special privilege. Moreover, the new CCL procedure con-
tains a clear procedural framework similar to tendering procedures in order to 
avoid lawsuits lasting months (or years) and legal uncertainties for incumbents 
and newcomers.  
Finally, the LA awards a license to operate the service under exclusivity for the 
license term to the winning bidder in the form of a contract pursuant to EC 1370.  
Step 4: PTA makes control decision  
If no expression of interest or, finally, no binding bid for a commercial service is 
submitted, the LA hands the procedure to the PTA which then decides whether or 
not to control the service directly via a public service contract. If it opts for a pub-
lic service contract, the PTA will then need to pay the supplementary direct subsi-
dies necessary to satisfy the minimum quality level (see Step 5). For example, 
numerous experts expect that services currently operated by municipal operators 
will in reality be non-commercial. 
On the other hand, if the PTA does not want to maintain direct control over the 
service for fiscal or political reasons, it can hand the procedure back to the LA, 
thereby precluding a costly and time-consuming awarding procedure and the need 
for subsidy payments, contract controlling and settlement of accounts. The LA 
then (again) initiates the formal market request to operators as described above. 
This time, however, the LA permits bids that fail to meet the minimum quality 
level of the PTP. The LA then identifies the operator offering the best quality on a 
commercial basis, as described above in Step 3.  
Step 5: PTA decides on direct award or a competitive procedure 
If the PTA decides to take direct control and wants to pay the supplementary di-
rect subsidies necessary to provide the minimum quality level, the proposed model 
foresees a decision about whether or not the service will be provided in-house. 
EC 1370 Art. 5 (2) defines in-house as a provision by “a legally distinct entity 
over which the competent local authority … exercises control similar to that exer-
cised over its own departments”, e.g., a municipal operator owned by the PTA. If 
the service in question will be provided by an in-house operator, competing opera-
tors are still free to submit expressions of interest to the PTA (already possible 
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today). Nonetheless, the PTA is also free to mandate its in-house operator accord-
ing to EC 1370, e.g., for political reasons.  
If no in-house operator is selected, the PTA can choose from the following op-
tions: 
 a direct award of supplementary direct subsidies  
o to small- and medium-sized enterprises on the condition of 
Art. 5 (4) EC 1370  
o to other enterprises in small shares on the condition of 
Art. 5 (4) EC 1370 
o to any operator as an emergency measure on the condition of 
Art. 5 (5) EC 1370  
 a competitive award of supplementary direct subsidies according to Art. 5 (3) 
EC 1370 (e.g., via negotiations with several operators)  
 a formal tender of supplementary direct subsidies under VOL/A which repre-
sents a clear, formal and adjudicated framework (and, of course, also satisfies 
Art. 5 (3) EC 1370).  
In any case, the LA checks the usual minimum criteria. Thereafter, the PTA con-
cludes the contract with the preselected operator or the winning bidder, which 
includes a license that provides exclusivity for the license term.2  
III. Conclusion 
This article proposes a model to adjust the current awarding framework in Germa-
ny. Although there are many international models, a fundamental change seems 
unrealistic for Germany considering the intense debate about cases in which com-
petition was already introduced. Thus, by using the decision tree illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, the proposed model aims to clarify the existing framework by assigning 
more clearly the roles and tasks of PTAs, LAs and operators within a specified 
time frame.  
The proposed model illustrates that the objectives for adjusting the existing Ger-
man model are both administratively feasible and realistic. It preserves the dichot-
omy between commercial and non-commercial services and offers a variety of 
___________________ 
2
  Again, access to the profession of being a bus operator is provided by the LA, here acting as a 
neutral authority between PTA and operator. 
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options for action to authorities and operators. Following the principle of subsidi-
arity promoted at the EU level, local market participants are free to select the pro-
cedure that fits their objectives, including the PTA‟s opportunity to select a mu-
nicipal operator. The proposed model enables competition of different awarding 
modes within the market without any clear preference on the part of the legislative 
body. The number of options is nevertheless reduced in favor of a clear awarding 
structure, e.g., it does not allow CCL applications that would disrupt an ongoing 
tendering procedure.  
At the same time, the general preferential treatment of market initiatives is one of 
the main pitfalls of the current system: if operators are licensed to provide com-
mercial services under an excessively low minimum quality set by the PTA in its 
PTP, e.g., due to false expectations regarding commercial feasibility, the PTA 
cannot take full control of the service, even if it wants to do so. The dichotomy 
between two different authorities raises the issue of coordination. I suggest that it 
would be helpful to maintain a licensing authority on a state level as seen in Low-
er Saxony. As in New Zealand, the LA could also, upon request, support the PTAs 
with consultant services on awarding procedures, and assume full responsibility 
for the awarding if the PTA does not want to become involved. 
Although the proposed model avoids any radical changes, the reduced level of 
overall uncertainty provided for new entrants has the potential to improve market 
development and reduce the entry barriers resulting from an unclear framework 
and non-transparent awarding procedures and revenue data. The potential of the 
incumbent to discriminate in a CCL procedure is mitigated by: (i) publication of 
the license‟s termination date (ii) limiting the role of the incumbent in developing 
the PTP, (iii) abolishing the incumbent‟s privilege in the CCL validation proce-
dure, and (iv) establishing minimum requirements for providing revenue data. 
Legal uncertainty can further be reduced by clearly-stated regulations about con-
ducting awarding procedures over time.  
If desired by the local authorities, the model allows a high level of freedom to op-
erators and even promotes innovation by offering a “patent”-like exclusivity to 
innovators. In general, the model allows for competition among ideas between 
operators and for competition among models for market organizations.  
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